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 The 1911 Revolution was a great political event marking the beginning 
of a new era in modern Chinese history. Yet as the end of 2,000 years of 
dynastic rule （imperial politics）, it also has long-term historical signifi cance 
that can be felt even in the present. Today, a century after the 1911 
Revolution, we need to look at this event from a macro perspective, on a 
scale of centuries and millennia, in order to fi x its place in Chinese history. In 
other words, we need to reexamine the signifi cance of the modern in the full 
sweep of Chinese history by looking at the 1911 Revolution. This will 
involve critically reexamining not only the 1911 Revolution but also percep-
tions and theories of modern Chinese history. From the perspective of these 
issues, in this essay I would like to present my views of the historical signif-
icance of the 1911 Revolution as seen from changes in the regional structure 
of Chinese history.
1. The Chinese World and the Qing Dynasty
 The Chinese world is a cultural sphere spread out on the eastern portion 
of the Eurasian landmass, a historical world that was called Hua or Xia 
during the Zhou dynasty （eleventh century-256 BCE）, and that was governed 
by many political systems over a long stretch of time. Though a succession of 
dynasties considered themselves rulers of the “center of civilization” 
（Zhonghua, China）, the culture of this area was strongly ethnocentric. This 
central region exerted great infl uence on surrounding areas and peoples, and 
it created a variety of diplomatic relations with these peoples through accep-
tance of tribute.
 According to some Japanese scholars （for example, Nishijima Sadao, with 
his thesis of the “East Asian world”）, leading to the formation of the Chinese 
world was a combination of political and cultural elements, such as 
Confucianism, Chinese characters, and Mahayana Buddhism （a variety of 
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Buddhism translated into Chinese）. Consistent with this view is the image of 
Confucian China. This image of China has become the received view in 
Japanese scholarly circles and is spreading widely in society at large. Yet it is 
important to note that the notion of the center of civilization in play here 
meant more than the diplomatic order between China and the “barbarians,” 
and more than the system of tribute and trade.
 This larger signifi cance is connected, of course, to the fact that regional 
order and international relations were frequently discussed in the context of 
relations of the Chinese court with the tribute states of Korea, Ryukyu, and 
Vietnam and with the Southern and Western states. For though commercial 
and military relations with these regions varied in intensity, court offi cials 
considered each of these regions worthy of attention. Also, by describing an 
order of Chinese and “barbarians” that made China central, the Confucian 
elite actively engaged in creating a Chinese world that defi ned the relation of 
center and periphery. From the perspective of the central elite, the Chinese 
world had a historically stable structure refl ecting the two millennia of 
expansion and development since the Qin and Han dynasties.
 Yet this Chinese world internally comprised a complex mixture of diverse 
elements related to different historical periods and regions that, geographi-
cally as well, gave rise to great changes. This is especially true of the great 
historical transition from classical China to early modern China in the ninth 
to twelfth centuries, as delineated in the thesis known as the Tang-Song 
transformation.1 This transformation was marked by the following changes:
• In the political sphere, the transition from an aristocratic system to a despotic 
monarchy
• In the cultural sphere, the waning of aristocratic culture and the rise of popular 
culture
• In the military and economic spheres, the institution of a standing army of 
recruited soldiers, and the introduction of government fi nance to support 
such an army
• In international relations, the birth of the nation-state in China and the estab-
lishment of independent states among the peoples of East Asia
• In the realm of philosophy, the development of Neo-Confucianism by the 
literati and the reform movements in Buddhism and Daoism
In his reinterpretation of Naitō’s thesis of a Tang and Song transformation, 
Seo Tatsuhiko understands the millennium from the late Eastern Han dynasty 
to the Song dynasty as “a period of transition from the Northern and 
 1 Naitō Konan fi rst presented his thesis of the Tang-Song transformation in 
“Gaikatsuteki Tō Sō jidai kan” （A Synoptic View of the Tang and Song 
Periods） （Rekishi to chiri 9, no. 5）, published in 1922.
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Southern Dynasties period, when nomadic-tribe movements directly gave rise 
to turning points, to the Sui and Tang dynasties, which saw the rise of 
continuous culture. Henceforth, development converged along a single path, 
namely, the formation of a common Han culture and the Han ethnic group.” 
And he presents the continuous changes in clothing, food, and housing, in 
coming of age, marriage, funerals, and ancestor worship, that produced the 
Han cultural identity.2
 This early modern China also experienced changes in dynasties—from 
the Song to the Yuan, Ming, and Qing— and witnessed expansion of its terri-
tory and changes in lifestyles and culture. During the Qing dynasty, the 
extension of control over the peripheral areas of Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, 
and Tibet led to a compound system of rule that gave a different character to 
politics, the economy, society, and culture. This new character not only 
greatly defi ned perceptions of China and debates over reform during the 
nineteenth-century confrontation with the West. Even during the twentieth 
century down to the present, this expanded notion of China has provided the 
prototype for thinking about China’s national territory, Chinese ethnic minor-
ities, and unifi cation of China.
 On this matter, the historical geographer Ge Jianxiong has offered the 
following interesting point. In Chinese history, the alteration of unifi cation 
and division has frequently been discussed. Though the unifi cation of China 
by the First Emperor in 221 BCE established a central government over the 
central plains, over the next more than 900 years, up to Mongol control 
during the Yuan dynasty,  the territory controlled by the central government 
expanded and shrank, while autonomous governmental authorities continued 
to exist in Chinese territory outside the control of the central government. 
This state of affairs cannot be called “unifi cation” in the strict sense. True 
unifi cation of China occurred in 1759 with the success of China’s central 
Eurasian campaigns to pacify the Dzungars, but this unifi cation lasted only till 
the Opium War, a total of a mere 81 years. Hence, in Chinese history, divi-
sion and divided rule were the norm, and unifi cation was rather short-lived.3
 Here we can see that China of the Qianlong period （1736-1795） has been 
made the standard of how unifi ed or divided China should be. Hence, with 
China at its largest extent （in 1759） as the yardstick, governments throughout 
 2 Seo Tatsuhiko, “Chūka no bunretsu to saisei” （The Division and Rebirth of 
China）, in Iwanami kōza sekai rekishi （Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999）, vol. 9, 
p. 73.
 3 Ge Jianxiong, Tongyi yu fenlie: Zhongguo lishi de qishi （Unifi cation and 
Division: Lessons form Chinese History）, revised and enlarged ed. （Beijing: 
Zhonghua Shuju, 2008）, pp. 77-78.
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Chinese history are compared in terms of power and territory, and in this way 
the geographical growth of China is measured. In this sense, while present-
day China historically follows the China of 1759 after its expansion under the 
Qianlong emperor, it is seen as something more—the rightful successor to 
the power of a unifi ed Qing China that lasted for a mere 81 years.
 In the view of Yoshikai Masato, this contemporary geographical and 
territorial perspective, enunciated as a thesis on the historical China, was 
created by historians and geographers amid a modern crisis of tense relations 
with the outside world in the context of trying to preserve the territorial 
integrity of China, and has developed into its present form today.4 Such 
theses on the historical China are interesting not only for studying the Qing 
dynasty, which expanded China to its largest extent, but also for considering 
modern and contemporary views of China’s past.5 Here I wish to emphasize 
a bird’s-eye view of twentieth-century Chinese history as a continuation of the 
history of the Qing dynasty and prior central dynasties in the context of 
external factors （especially the global economy）. Of particular concern have 
been the positive and negative effects on China’s modernization, of “tradi-
tional” strengths that have continued as an undercurrent in China’s system and 
culture, but that have surfaced amid China’s pursuit of its Reform and 
Opening Policy since the 1980s.
 In this context, the assumed tradition is not the legacy of the ancient past. 
Rather, it is usually the recent past, a period contiguous with but separate 
from the present, namely, Qing China of the seventeenth to nineteenth centu-
ries. Thus, to understand present-day China, it is necessary to return to China 
of the Qianlong period. In other words, while looking at all the changes, we 
have to seek out unchanging structures and thinking, and reconsider present-
day China in light of the last two to three hundred years.6
 4 Yoshikai Masato, “Rekishigakusha to kokudo ishiki” （Historians and Territorial 
Perceptions）, in Shirīzu 20 seiki Chūgokushi, edited by Iijima Wataru, Kubo 
Tōru, Murata Yūjirō, vol. 2: Kindaisei no kōzō （Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 2009）, pp. 81-102.
 5 Kō Tōran （Huang Donglan）, “Shinmatsu, Minkokuki chiri kyōkasho no kūkan 
hyōshō: Ryōdo, kyōiki, kokuchi,” （Spatial Representations in Late Qing and 
Republican Textbooks: Territory, Borders, and National Humiliation）, 
Chūgoku kenkyū geppō, no. 685 （March 2005）: 24-39.
 6 An important feature of the 1911 Revolution is that it began not in a metro-
politan city but in the southern provinces. In particular, the New Armies 
seized the provincial government offi ces and proclaimed their independence. It 
was Mizoguchi Yūzō who fi rst pointed out this peculiarity of the 1911 
Revolution and the unique developments of modern Chinese history, in 
contrast to the French Revolution and the Meiji Restoration, which began in 
the central cities. From the late Ming and early Qing, the maturation of local 
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 Relatedly, Philip Kuhn says that the modern era began for China with a 
series of sociopolitical crises that occurred in the 1790s late in the Qianlong 
period, and that prior to the confrontation with the West, some Chinese offi -
cials and literati were beginning to become aware of areas where China 
needed to modernize and beginning to conceive of reforms that might be 
instituted.7 He points to three structural dilemmas that imperial China faced 
late in the Qianlong period:
• Confronting the abuse of power
• The political energies of the cultural elite
• Governing a huge society with a small bureaucracy
As is well known, each of these dilemmas were problems calling for funda-
mental systemic reforms affecting the basis for operating a modern nation, 
and each became a widely discussed political topic during the late Qing Self-
Strengthening Movement, Hundred Days Reform, and Constitutional 
Movement, and also in the Republican government after the 1911 Revolution. 
Yet the perception of crises and the search for solutions to overcome the 
crises had already begun among “traditionalists” as early as the late eigh-
teenth century.
 Seen in this fashion, the concept of the Chinese world—while including 
foreign relations based on the order between China and the “barbarian” states, 
and on the system of tribute and trade—can perhaps also be interpreted as a 
transcending concept directed at a high-level system of culture. In other 
words, this system of culture, while defi ning China as a country with a terri-
tory and border, also defi nes China as an arena opening up to oceanic Asia 
and the central Eurasian landmass.8 From this perspective, it becomes possible 
to reinterpret the concept of China-as-center thinking （Zhonghua sixiang）, a 
concept frequently encountered in Japanese historiography to mean 
Han-Chinese-centered ethnocentrism. In contrast to the internal-oriented, 
exclusive concept of Chinese-versus-barbarian thinking （Hua-Yi sixiang）, we 
can interpret China-as-center thinking as a universal ideology along the lines 
space strengthened the provinces, making them capable of developing modern 
local self-government （“Shingai Kakumei no rekishiteki kosei” [Historical 
Peculiarities of the 1911 Revolution], Shisō [Iwanami Shoten], no. 989 
[September 2006]: 88-107）.
 7 Philip A. Kuhn, Origins of the Modern Chinese State （Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2002）, p. 162.
 8 Hamashita Takeshi, Kindai Chūgoku no kokusaiteki keiki: Chōkō bōeki 
shisutemu to kindai Ajia （Modern China’s International Moment: The Tribute 
Trade System and Modern Asia） （Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1990）. 
Peter Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia 
（Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005）.
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of its principle of openness and broadness.9
 In short, the concept of China （Zhonghua） does not designate a physical 
body but rather proscribes the existing relationship between one’s own culture 
and that of others. This notion began in ancient China and throughout 
Chinese history has infl uenced the content of thought and the order of 
discourse according to the social relations and mutual perceptions of one’s 
own culture and that of the other.10 For example, in Dayi juemi lu （Record of 
Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion, 1729）, Yongzheng, the mid-Qing 
Manchu emperor of China, transcended the distinction between China 
（Zhonghua） and barbarian （yidi） with his notions of “Chinese and barbarian 
as one family” （Hua-Yi yijia） and “China and the periphery as one body” 
（Zhong-wai yiti）. The Qing court ruled over the empire not by reason of race, 
but by reason of its virtue. Similarly, the legitimacy of the Qing emperor’s 
rule over the empire had nothing to do with force or origins, and everything 
to do with the emperor’s present historically unprecedented benevolent 
governance. So asserted the Yongzheng emperor with supreme confi dence. 
This work, together with the emperor’s edicts aimed at relieving oppression 
of commoners and the system of talent selection based on merit, can be seen 
as the acme of open Qing China-as-center thinking.11
 China of the Qianlong period saw unprecedented expansion of its territory. 
If we view China of this period as the prototype for present thinking about 
unifi cation of China, we can think of the Chinese world as a composite 
nation of several ethnic groups and cultures transcending the former distinc-
tion between Chinese and “barbarian.” Moreover, this world is not a concen-
trically structured model of Han and non-Han Chinese. Rather, it is a plural-
istic, stratifi ed political order with spatially disparate elements.12 If this is the 
case, the Chinese world is not a fi xed body transcending history. It is a way 
 9 Seo Tatsuhiko, Chōan no toshi keikaku （Chang’an Urban Planning） （Tokyo: 
Kōdansha, 2001）, p. 66.
10 Watanabe Hideyuki, Kodai “Chūka” kannen no keisei （The Formation of the 
Concept of China [Zhonghua] in Premodern Times） （Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
2010）.
11 Kishimoto Mio and Miyajima Hiroshi, Min Shin to Ri-chō no jidai （The Age 
of Ming and Qing China and the Korean Yi Dynasty）, Sekai no rekishi 
（History of the World）, no. 12 （Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1998）, pp. 318-320.
12 Oka Hiroki, Shindai Mongoru meiki seido no kenkyū （Studies of the Mongol 
League-Banner System during the Qing Period） （Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 2007）. 
Sugiyama Kiyohiko, “Dai Shin Teikoku no Manshū tōji to teikoku tōgō no 
kōzō” （Qing Imperial Rule over Manchuria and the Structure of Imperial 
Integration）, in Kindai Tōhoku Ajia no tanjō: Kokyōshi e no kokoromi （The 
Birth of Modern Northeast Asia: Toward a Transborder History）, edited by 
Sakon Yukimura （Sapporo: Hokkaidō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2008）.
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of expressing the compound political order created in a particular historical 
environment—that of Qing China, or more fully, the central Eurasian Great 
Qing Empire.
 The southern revolutionaries in the 1911 Revolution sought to overthrow 
this Qing state and its accompanying political order.
2. The Nation and the State
 In thus historically resituating the 1911 Revolution according to this 
perspective, we confront the new concepts of minzu （nation） and guojia 
（state） and the relation between these two concepts. The word minzu, a cate-
gory that acknowledges the people of different groups as bound together, fi rst 
appeared in China at the end of the nineteenth century. Around the time of the 
Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the twentieth century, nationhood became 
perceived as an essential element in progress, civilization, and national 
survival. As Chen Tianhua and Sun Yat-sen said, what was needed was 
nationalism, that cohesive force of the people, to bind scattered individuals 
together so that they could thrive in an age of imperial contention. Perception 
of this need could not be separated from criticism of and refl ection on 
China’s present and past circumstances, as seen early on in Liang Qichao’s 
essay “Zhongguo jiruo suyuan lun” （The Sources of China’s Weaknesses） 
（Qing yi bao, nos. 77-84 [1899]）. In “Zhongguo-shi xulun” （An Introduction 
to Chinese History） （Qing yi bao, nos. 90-91 [1901]）, Liang Qichao tried to 
refocus history on the people. And in Xinmin shuo （The New Citizen）, he 
forcefully presented the pressing need for forming a citizenry. These two 
works thus show that Liang Qichao sought to form a modern state truly orga-
nized around the citizenry.
 During the 1911 Revolution, revolutionaries, royalists, and constitutional-
ists, whether supporting or opposing the existing system, sought political 
infl uence to build a modern state capable of prospering and defending itself, 
and to create a constitutional form of government that encourages private 
enterprise. For this purpose, the revolutionaries pursued an ethnic revolution 
of overthrowing the Manchus and promoting Han Chinese, while the royalists 
and constitutionalists pursued a more moderate transition from imperial abso-
lutism to a constitutional monarchy. At the time, the nationalism of the revo-
lutionaries conveyed two meanings to people, whether they approved or 
disapproved, namely, a domestic ethnic revolution and opposition to foreign 
invasion and carving up of China. That is, the revolutionaries pursued a 
twofold nationalism comprising an anti-foreign-power statism （national impe-
rialism, to use Liang Qichao’s term） and a racial movement seeking to over-
throw the Manchus and promote Han Chinese. Even prior to this topical 
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development, an ethnic nationalism comprising cultivation of national aware-
ness and construction of a modern state organized around the people had been 
conceived and implemented in educational reforms at the end of the Qing 
period. 
 Yet in the history of late Qing revolutionary thought, not enough attention 
has been paid to how such new concepts as race, people, and nation affected 
actual revolutionary thought and political movements, particularly with regard 
to ethnic differences within the nation. One conceivable reason is that for 
China to resist foreign pressure, it was fi rst necessary for China to drive out 
the Manchu “barbarians,” and that once China established a Han Chinese 
state and democratic republic, one desideratum of ethnic nationalism would 
be fulfi lled, or so it was thought. Though some thought like Chen Tianhua in 
“Lun Zhongguo yi gaichuang minzhu zhengti” （China Should Institute a 
Democratic Form of Government） （Minbao, no. 1, 1905）, most revolutionaries 
thought that China should integrate or exclude Manchus, Mongols, Turkic 
Muslims, and Tibetans according to abstract notions of the nation.
 However, in the creation of a modern nation-state out of the multiethnic, 
multicultural Qing empire, a one-time, short political revolution could not 
provide the means to solve issues such as how to manage the territory and 
ethnic composition of the new China, or how to promote ethnic awareness 
among ethnic groups. In fact, tense relations and an interesting controversy 
broke out between revolutionaries and constitutionalists over the place of 
Manchus, Mongols, Turkic Muslims, and Tibetans in the future Republic of 
China.
 As can be seen in the controversy in Minbao （People’s News） and Xinmin 
congbao （New Citizen Journal）, one of the points of contention between the 
revolutionaries and the royalists （reformers） was whether to exclude the 
Manchus from the revolution or to not discriminate between Manchu and Han 
Chinese. The revolutionaries emphasized the history of Manchu suppression 
and exploitation of Han Chinese, and advocated a return to the nationalism of 
the Ming and earlier dynasties, when Han Chinese controlled the reins of 
government. In response, the constitutionalists asserted that the Manchus had 
already reigned over Han Chinese society for a long time, and that they have 
culturally and linguistically assimilated to Han Chinese society, and thus saw 
no basis for excluding the Manchus as a way of exacting revenge. The anti-
Manchu racism of the revolutionaries around Sun Yat-sen was later pointed 
out as limited by its Han Chinese chauvinism and overly optimistic assess-
ments about imperialism （and Japan in particular）. Yet Sun Yat-sen’s nation-
alism was not limited to racial revenge, but was clearly aimed at forming a 
modern nation-state system. In other words, the goals of overcoming ethnic 
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differences and creating a new Chinese nation were closely tied together. But 
was it wise to seek to achieve these two aims through revolution? How 
should we today understand the nationalism of the time, with its intertwined 
notions of race, people, and nation?
 If we look at the racial theories of the revolutionaries of the time, we can 
see that in the table on the “yellow race” in Zou Rong’s Geminjun （The 
Revolutionary Army）, this race was broadly divided into the Chinese race and 
the Siberian race, and that Mongols and Manchus were included in the 
Mongolian race, which was subsumed under the Siberian race. As is obvious, 
the purpose of this division was to emphasize differences between Manchus 
and Han Chinese. At the time, this theory of racial classifi cation was received 
as the latest science. There were also cases where racially tinged Sino-
Japanese disturbances became politicized and even became diplomatic issues, 
such as the Anthropology Pavilion incident of the fi fth National Industrial 
Exposition, held in Osaka in 1903.
 Only after his exile to Japan did Liang Qichao begin borrowing ethnic 
and racial terms from Japanese and applying them to the Chinese revolution. 
Contributing greatly to the spread of such terms was his essay “Zhongguo-shi 
xulun.” In the fi fth section of this essay, he divided China residents into the 
six ethnicities of “the Miao, the Han, Tibetans, Mongols, the Xiongnu, and 
Tunguses,” thus redefi ning the peoples of Chinese history. In addition, in his 
essay “Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo” （The Theories of the Great 
Political Scientist Johann Kaspar Bluntschli） （Xinmin congbao, nos. 38-39）, 
Liang Qichao also wrote, “China will not perish in the future. That being the 
case, we ought to adopt strong political tactics toward the outside world, 
uniting Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, the Miao, and Tibetans 
into one great nation.” He thus advocated unity of the fi ve ethnic groups 
located in Qing quasi-offi cial ethnic regions （the Manchus, Han Chinese, 
Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans）, together with the Miao, to form one great 
nation. Needless to say, this nation largely included the same ethnic groups as 
the term “Chinese nation” of later periods.
 In fact, the ethnic and racial arguments supporting the revolutionaries’ 
“ethnic revolution” echoes in various places Bluntschli’s theory of the state, 
as introduced by Liang Qichao. For example, a comparison of Wang 
Jingwei’s essay “Minzu de guomin” （An Ethnic Nation） （Minbao, nos. 1-2, 
1905） with Liang Qichao’s “Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo” 
reveals at a glance that the former essay builds on the ethnic and racial theo-
ries of Liang Qichao to come to opposite conclusions. Notwithstanding their 
withering criticism of the royalists on the correctness of the ethnic revolution, 
the ethnic theories of such revolutionaries as Wang Jingwei borrowed many 
concepts, terms, and frameworks of the issues from Liang Qichao’s previ-
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ously published essay.
 In short, the revolutionaries and the royalists, which had sharply opposed 
views on whether to preserve the Qing imperial system, were unexpectedly 
closely aligned on integrating ethnic differences. Even the foremost champion 
of excluding Manchus, Zhang Binglin （also known as Zhang Taiyan）, though 
advocating revenge and Han political restoration during his editorship of 
Minbao, gradually abandoned his notions of ethnicity and increasingly spoke 
of building a China that integrated citizen Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans 
into society. During that time, he held that preserving China’s national 
essence （national characteristics） was crucial to Chinese nationalism, and thus 
he founded, together with such revolutionary classics scholars as Liu Shipei 
and Huang Jie, Guocui xuebao （Journal of National Essence） and worked to 
advertise and promote China studies. On this conception of China studies, 
traditional scholarship, reread in the modern framework of national essence 
acquired from Japan, was to provide backing for the revolution.
 The term “Chinese nation” （Zhonghua minzu） spread around 1905, during 
the debates of the Minbao and the Xinmin congbao. There was divergence in 
the use of the term. It sometimes meant Han Chinese （thus lending support to 
nationalism in the narrow sense） and sometimes included the fi ve （or six） 
ethnic groups of China （thus lending support to nationalism in the broad 
sense）. Yet in general, revolutionaries gradually came to accept this notion in 
the broad sense, and as a result of the 1911 Revolution, the term came to 
suggest that the ethnic groups would integrate and blend together.
3. North and South in Chinese History
 In the controversy over the Chinese race, the 1907 debate between the 
constitutional monarchists and the revolutionary Zhang Binglin is interesting. 
Yang Du, in “Jintiezhuyi shuo” （The Theory of Economic Militarism）, 
asserted that “the fi ve ethnic groups—Han, Manchus, Mongols, Turkic 
Muslims, and Tibetans—are all Chinese nationals,” and that these fi ve ethnic 
groups should be united to form the Chinese nation. Yang Du opposed a 
revolution that excluded Manchus; saw Manchus and Han Chinese as equal; 
wanted to assimilate Mongols, Turkic Muslims, and Tibetans; and proposed a 
policy of uniting China’s ethnic groups. Writing in rebuttal was Zhang 
Binglin in “Zhonghua Minguo jie” （Explaining the Republic of China）. Here 
we can see his tone shifting from a racially infl ected call for revenge to 
something more subtle. It was not that his revolutionary thesis based on a 
confrontation between Manchus and Han Chinese had changed. Rather, in his 
criticism of economic militarism, this peerless revolutionary theorist here 
turned his attention to the complicated relation between ethnic differences and 
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the formation of a nation. Here Zhang Binglin defi nitely defi ned the Republic 
of China as a republic organized around the Chinese race.
 Moreover, Yang Du’s argument was by no means an isolated statement. 
There were many sympathizers, including royalists such as Liang Qichao, as 
well as the capital intellectuals and country gentry who moved for a provi-
sional constitution. Moreover, it was noticed that some Manchu aristocrats 
studying in Japan supported Yang Du’s call for uniting the fi ve ethnic groups 
into the Chinese race, and that they also advocated constitutional reforms 
allowing a multiethnic nationalism （Wuzesheng, Preface, Datong bao, no. 1, 
1907）. Of course, as benefi ciaries of the Qing imperial system, these Manchu 
bannermen were politically up against the nationalism excluding Manchus. 
Indeed, bannermen foreign students were enemies in the eyes of revolution-
aries. Nonetheless, Yang Du and Wuzesheng were without doubt Chinese 
nationalists in that they conceived early on how the new state should relate to 
the ethnic groups.13
 If we look at these developments regionally, we can see that Yang Du 
was led to a nationalism of uniting the fi ve ethnic groups in large measure 
because he was active in Beijing, where relations were tense between 
Manchus and Han Chinese. Since he worked in the Xianzheng Biancha Guan 
（Offi ce to Draw Up Regulations for Constitutional Government） and saw at 
fi rst hand the ramifi cations of constitutional reform, he must have been keenly 
aware of the dual structure of the Qing empire consisting of a central region 
and periphery. In contrast, most revolutionaries were based mainly in the 
south and had little sense of the reality of events in Mongolia, Tibet, and 
other peripheral regions. For them, events in these regions were those of a 
distant world, or they were negatively associated with Qing court corruption 
or “barbarians.” Such was the context in which the 1911 Revolution 
occurred.
 From this perspective, the difference in views toward ethnic groups of the 
revolutionaries （Zhang Binglin） and the constitutionalists/royalists （Yang Du 
and Liang Qichao） consisted of more than just a difference in attitudes toward 
the Qing court, for in the development and growth of the Chinese world, we 
can see north-south regional differences.
 As touched on above, Seo Tatsuhiko calls the millennium from the third 
to thirteenth century the age of “Chinese division and rebirth,” and he places 
the historic epoch-making events of the Tang and Song transformation amid 
13 Murata Yūjirō, “Chūka minzoku ron no keifu” （The Genealogy of Theses on 
Chinese Ethnic Groups）, in Shirīzu 20 seiki Chūgokushi, edited by Iijima 
Wataru, Kubo Tōru, Murata Yūjirō, vol. 1: Chūka sekai to kindai （Tokyo: 
Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2009）, pp. 81-102.
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the transition from the nomadic-tribe movements and southern incursions of 
the Northern and Southern Dynasties period to the continuous culture of the 
Sui and Tang periods. He then presents the historical undercurrents of the 
formation of Han ethnic identity. This ethnic identity had two cultural 
features bequeathed to later ages. They were “the nomadic and livestock-
farming culture of the dry regions of the north, and the crop- and produce-
farming cultures of the wet regions of the south.” After the Sui and Tang 
dynasties, the Liao and Jin dynasties （contending with the Song dynasty to the 
south）, and later the Yuan and Qing dynasties, based themselves in the 
northern natural climes and historical environment and controlled not only 
China proper but also Manchuria and Mongolia. These northern dynasties had 
cultures widely seen on the Eurasian steppes. They deployed nomadic 
mounted armies and worshipped world religions （Buddhism, etc.）, and they 
ruled linearly over their peoples from scattered cities. In contrast, the Han 
Chinese dynasties that ruled over the south and that succeeded the Southern 
Dynasties （the later Tang, the Song, and the Ming） produced cultures that 
were continuous with Southeast Asia, cultures based on fertile farm land and 
southern sea trade. These dynasties had infantry armies and navies, and they 
worshipped traditional religions （Daoism）. They ruled directly on a face-to-
face basis, bringing government down to the local level. So writes Seo.14
 If we thus look at Chinese history since the Northern and Southern 
Dynasties, or since the Sui and Tang dynasties, as being a confl uence of 
infl uences from cultures of the north and south, then it is not too far off the 
mark to say that the revolutionaries’ view of China’s ethnic groups and the 
state was based on southern crop- and produce-farming culture, whereas the 
constitutionalists’ view of China’s ethnic groups and the state was based on 
northern nomadic and livestock-farming culture.
 Viewed in terms of its regional structure, the historical event that was the 
1911 Revolution produced a dynamism of these two strong intertwined and 
confl icting threads running through Chinese history. We can say that politi-
cally, the southern revolutionaries won the abdication of the emperor and the 
establishment of the republic, but we can also say that the northern constitu-
tionalists achieved their aim of continuing the legacy of a multiethnic nation. 
The contest of strength between the contrasting cultures of north and south 
seen in the 1911 Revolution unleashed an active dynamism in Chinese poli-
tics. In the future as well, we can expect China’s multiethnic complex 
cultural environment to determine the course of Chinese history.
14 Seo Tatsuhiko, “Chūka no bunretsu to saisei,” p. 76.
